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A Pointillist Approach for Comparing Honeypots

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Abstract. The concept of electronic decoys (*honeypots*), which are network resources that are deployed to be probed, attacked, and eventually compromised, is used in the area of IT security to learn more about attack patterns and attackers' behavior in real-world networks. Our research focuses on gathering detailed statistics on the threats over a long period of time in order to get a better understanding of their characteristics. In this perspective, we are deploying honeypots of different interaction levels in various locations. At a first glance, these honeypots can be considered as permanent sensors that gather statistical information on a long-term perspective.
Generally speaking, honeypots are often classified by their level of interaction. For instance, it is admitted that a high interaction approach is suited for recording hacker shell commands, while a low interaction approach provides limited information on the attackers' activities. So far, there exists no serious comparison to express the level of information on which both approaches differ. Thanks to the environment that we are deploying, we are able to provide a rigorous comparison between the two approaches, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The proposed analysis leads to an interesting study of malicious activities hidden by the noise of less interesting ones. Furthermore, it shows the complementarities of the two approaches: a high interaction honeypot allows controlling the relevance of low interaction honeypot configurations. Thus, both interaction levels are required to build an efficient network of distributed honeypots.

Keywords: Honeypot Interaction, Attack Monitoring, Correlation, Forensics

1 Introduction

Many solutions exist to observe malicious traffic on the Internet. However, they often consist in monitoring at a very large number of honeypots (unused address spaces) to monitor malicious activities. Several names have been used to describe this technique, such as *network telescopes* [Cai05, MVS01], *blackholes* [SMS, CM], *darknets* [Cym04] and *Internet Motion Sensor* (IMS) [CBM+04]. Some other solutions consist in passive measurement of live networks by centralizing and analyzing firewall logs or IDS alerts [Cen, YBJ04]. Coarse-grained interface counters and more fine-grained flow analysis tools such as NetFlow [Sys] offer another readily available source of information.

So far, nobody has investigated the possibility of using a large number of local and similar sensors deployed all over the Internet. However, we strongly believe that local observations can complement the more global ones listed above. A direct analogy can be made here with weathercast or volcanic eruption prediction. As a consequence, we are deploying many honeypot environments in various locations thanks to motivated partners, as part of the Leurre.com Project. The main

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objective consists in gathering statistics and precise information on the attacks that occur in the wild on a long-term perspective. We have initially used high interaction honeypots. Then, because of the incoming and increasing number of participants in addition with the hard constraints imposed by their implementations, we have considered the idea of deploying low interaction honeypots. At this time writing, some environments of different interaction levels are running. We invite the interested reader to have a look at the existing publications for more information on that point [DPD04a, PD04a].

The environmental setup we have developed gives us the opportunity to make a rigorous comparison of the different interaction approaches, both qualitatively and quantitatively. So far, there does not exist other comparison like this. Honeypots have been classified in application categories without concrete justification [Spi02a]. For instance, it is admitted that a high interaction approach is suited for recording hacker shell commands, while a low interaction approach provides limited information on the attackers' activities. This paper intends to show this classification is too restrictive. In regards of our research objectives, both approaches present values.

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- We show that both approaches provide very similar global statistics based on the information we collect.
- A comparison of data collected by both types of environments leads to an interesting study of malicious activities that are hidden by the noise of less interesting ones.
- This analysis highlights the complementarities of the two approaches: a high interaction honeypot allows controlling the relevance of low interaction honeypot configurations. Thus, both interaction levels are required to build an efficient network of distributed honeypots.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes and justifies the setup of a distributed honeypot platform. It also briefly depicts the so-called Leurre.com environment. This environment has been implemented in two different ways corresponding to two distinct interaction levels. The analysis is then built on these two approaches. Section 3 makes a comparison on global statistics obtained by means of these two distinct implementations. Particularly, we show the similarity of the information provided by the two environments. In Section 4 we take a closer look at some activities that could potentially be different between platforms. This in-depth study of both platforms leads to the discovery of strange attack scenarii that require a particular attention. We also show that high interaction honeypots can be used as reference points to optimize the configuration of low interaction ones. These two last Sections bring us to explain the motivations behind the Leurre.com project that we are deploying. The last Section concludes this paper.

2 Environment Setup: two different levels of interaction

2.1 High Interaction Experimental Setup - H_1

We have presented in previous publications [DPD04a, DPD04b] some experiments based on so called "high interaction honeypots". this environment, called

in the following H_1, is a virtual network built on top of Vmware (see Figure 1) [Cor]. Three machines are attached to a virtual Ethernet switch [3] supporting ARP spoofing. The VMware commercial product enables us to configure them according to our specific needs. mach0 is a Windows98 workstation, mach1 is a Windows NT Server and mach2 is a Linux Redhat 7.3 server. The three virtual guests are built on non-persistent disks [Cor]: changes are lost when virtual machines are powered off or reset. We perform regular reboots to guarantee that the virtual machines are not compromised, as the objectives consist in gathering statistical data in a long-term perspective. A fourth virtual machine is created to collect data in the virtual network. It is also attached to the virtual switch and tcpdump is used as a packet gatherer [uti]. This machine and the VMware host station are totally invisible from outside. Both mach0 and mach2 run an ftp server; in addition, mach1 also provides a static web server. Logs are collected daily and transferred to a centralized place.



Fig. 1. H_1 Environment scheme

We have also made some comparisons with another "high interaction" honeynet called GenII [The03]. However, the collected data were based on snort-inline alerts. First, alerts provide different information than row data and are quite likely false positives. Second, snort-inline drop packets based on the way it *estimates risk*. These two reasons have prevented us to make interesting comparisons at this stage. We do not refer to this architecture in the following.

2.2 Low Interaction Experimental Setup - H_2

We have deployed a platform called H_2 similar to the one presented before, but with emulated operating systems and services. We have developed it based on some open source utilities. Indeed, it consists in a modified version of Honeyd [hon04]. The platform only needs a single host station, which is carefully secured by means of access controls and integrity checks. Honeyd emulation is limited to a configuration file and a few scripts. It emulates the three same Operating Systems than H_1 for mach0, mach1 and mach2. We have scanned the open ports in H_1 and

[3] A switch in the VMWare jargon actually behaves as a hub

opened the very same ones in the Honeyd configuration file for each three virtual machines. Some service scripts that are available in [hon04] have been linked to open ports, like port 80 (web server) or port 21 (ftp). As a consequence, H_2 interaction refers to a list of open ports and simple scripts. It can be seen as simplistic behavioral model of H_1.
Everyday, we connect to each machine to retrieve traffic logs and check security logs.

2.3 Information Extraction

Dump files are collected from H_1 and H_2. They are stored in a centralized database. They are also analyzed by means of other utilities and this information is collected as well. To make it short, and for a better understanding of the following sections, we list below some information types that can extracted from the dump files:

- IP Geographical location
- Domain name resolution
- Passive OS fingerprinting
- TCP stream analysis
- Etc

We do not want to detail the database architecture here; we invite the interested reader to look at our previous publications, where we have introduced the setup in detail [PDD05].

3 Platforms comparison

3.1 Introduction

To validate models, we need to check their conformance with standard structure behavior. Honeypots can be seen as *black boxes*: they describe a device whose internal structure can be disregarded. All we need to know is that the device transforms given inputs into predictable outputs. It can thus be treated as opaque, as if its contents cannot be seen. If we briefly formalize this: let be I_1 the set of information pieces provided by Honeypot H_1 (the high interaction honeypot). In the same way, let be I_2 the set of information pieces provided by Honeypot H_1 (the low interaction honeypot). Intuitively, we have $I_2 \subset I_1$. However, it is more difficult to estimate on which extent I_2 brings less information. The following Sections intend to qualify and quantify this information difference $I_1 - I_2$.

The initial setting is the following: Honeynets H_1 and H_2 are both placed in the same environment, i.e. the same network, but with different addresses. The virtual machines mach0, mach1 and mach2 have three adjacent IPs in H_1, say X.X.X.1, X.X.X.2, X.X.X.3. In a similar way, virtual machines mach0, mach1 and mach2 in H_2 have contiguous addresses which are very close, resp. X.X.X.6, X.X.X.7, X.X.X.8. Honeynet H_1 has been running since February 2003. Honeynet H_2 started running on July 2004. A technical problem prevented us to collect the whole November 2004 month. Thus, we will focus on data collected on both environments from August 2004 to October 2004, that is 10 continuous weeks.

We propose in the following Section to study the differences between both platforms on that period, thanks to the preprocessed data stored in our database(see Section 2.3).

3.2 Analysis on global statistics

Attack Categories Both environments H_1 and H_2 are targets of attacks. However, each environment contains three virtual machines running different services and different OSs. They are apparently not equally targeted. This leads us to define three major categories of attacks:

- The ones which target only one machine. They are called attacks of Type I.
- The ones which target two out of three virtual machines. They are called attacks of Type II.
- The ones which target the three virtual machines. They are called attacks of Type III

Attack Type	H_1 Environment	H_2 Environment
Total	7150	7364
Type I	4204 (59%)	4544 (62%)
Type II	288 (4%)	278 (4%)
Type III	2658 (37%)	2542 (34%)

Table 1. Different Attack Types observed on H_1 and H_2

Table 3.2 represents the distribution (in percentage) of these 3 categories on each environment H_1 and H_2. Values are very similar. Now, we propose a closer look at Type III attacks. They stem for around 35% of the whole attacks. Figure 3.2 represents the number of associated sources observed on environments H_1 (dark curve)) and H_2 (light curve) every 2 days. Curves have the same general shape. We expected no difference insofar as we have made the assumption in [PD04a] that attacks targeting the three virtual honeypots are to be scans. Thus, scans should be observed independently on the platform. In other words, there should the same number of scans on both platforms. This is not exactly the case on Figure 3.2 where curves have small dissimilarities.

A closer look at the attacks confirms that almost all IP sources associated to Type III attacks have been observed on both environments. For those which are not included in one curve, it appears that they are classified as attacks of type III in one environment, and in attacks of Type II with the other one. In seldom cases, they are even classified as attacks of type I. An analysis of such attacks reveals that they often consist in a single TCP packet sent to one target. It might happen that packets are lost due to congestions in the Internet and we can also imagine that such packets are not retransmitted by the attacker. To validate this assumption, we check that there is any bias in the loss observation, that is, we observe an equal number of packet losses on platform H_1 and on platform H_2. In addition, the number of supposed scan packet losses is distributed among all virtual machines without apparent preferences. We point out that the value



Fig. 2. Attacks of Type III on the two French platforms H_1 and H_2

we observe can be linked to the estimated TCP packet loss value in the path between the attack machine and the honeypot environment at a given date. If for a period of time $\Delta(t)$ the estimated packet loss between the attacking source and the honeypots environment is *p_loss*, then the probability Pr to get an incomplete scan on the six virtual machines becomes:

$$Pr = 1 - (1 - p\_loss)^6 \tag{1}$$

In our cases, we identify 86 such losses over a total of 2658 type III attacks of the 2-month observation. According to the previous equation, this is equivalent to an average packet loss of 0.6%, which remains coherent with actual traffic monitoring [Cen01]. This is even quite low if we compare with the global average 2-5% observed on the Internet Traffic Report web site [Rep05]. However, we also note on their site high differences between continents. European traffic seems less susceptible, in average, to packet losses than other continents like Asia.

A first assertion is:

Assertion 1 *This is not necessary to deploy honeypots using hundreds of public IP addresses in order to identify scan activities against large block IPs. Three addresses contained in that block are sufficient. Large-scale scans will be attacks on the three honeypot machines. We may observe only two attempts in case of packet losses, as it appears scans do not implement retransmission processes.*

To complete the analysis, we also observe another interesting property based on the fact that virtual machines have being assigned contiguous IP addresses. There is one principal scanning technique which consists in targeting IPs by increasing IP number. To quantify this scanning method, we represent in 3.2 the six possible orders of scanning that have been observed. We give for each of them their frequency (in percentage), that is, the number of Sources which have targeted the three virtual machines over the total number of Sources associated to Type III attacks.

The frequencies remain quite constant ($\simeq 4\%$) over months. Attacks targeting machines by increasing IP number corresponds to 79% of the total. The other frequencies are equally distributed. It is important to point out that all attacks which have targeted one platform in the last 5 orders have scanned the other environment in the increasing sequence order (order 1). Another good indicator

Type III Attack Order	Percentage
Order 1: Mach0, Mach1, Mach2	79%
Order 2: Mach0, Mach2, Mach1	5%
Order 3: Mach1, mach0, Mach2	4%
Order 4: Mach1, Mach2, Mach0	5%
Order 5: Mach2, Mach0, Mach1	3%
Order 6: Mach2, Mach1, Mach0	4%

Table 2. Potential orders of scanning for Type III attacks

to complete this analysis is the observed sequence of ports used by the attacking source on the different virtual machines. It consists in an arithmetic sequence which as a common difference of 1. This simple observation leads to three major remarks:

- We do not observe scan activities that sweep through IP addresses following a sequential decrease.
- All scans that target three consecutive IPs are programmed to hit them in sequential increasing order. It might happen, however, that the order is slightly disrupted because of some packet retransmissions. A simple glance at the attacker source ports confirms this. The non-privileged ports are used sequentially.
- Scanning machines do not wait for a scan to be finished in order to target the next IP. Scanning threads are not blocking. In other words, we observe that temporal periods of scanning activities against two virtual machines from a same source can overlap.

Such information can be interesting for defense preventing systems. If two honeypot sensors are placed on the first/last IPs of a given Network IP range, a preemptive block of all sources having targeted these unused IPs would avoid them to reach the other network machines. It is all the more important that we have shown by means of simple experiments in [PD04a] that global scanning activities are often preliminary steps to accurate attacks on opened ports. We are studying the feasibility of such a system. Finally, we intend to have a closer look at scanner implementation options in order to build relationships with the observed traces. For instance, the advscan Sourceforge Project allows some variables like the number of concurrent threads, the delay or the scanning duration [adv05].

Type II Attack Analysis Attacks of Type II represent a small fraction of all observed attacks. As we explain in the previous Section, some scanning activities that target a large block of IPs can *miss* some addresses insofar as the tools do not retransmit lost packets. It has been observed that 88% of the attacks of type II are residues of scanning attacks on both environments H_1 and H_2, and thus, are incomplete Type III attacks. The remaining 12% are more interesting.

- For 9% of Type II attacks: The IPs have been observed against two virtual machines on one environment, namely mach0 and mach2. The attacking IPs have also been observed on the other environment. A closer look at the attacker source ports leads to the conclusion that these attacks scan one out of two successive IPs. Indeed, all these IPs which have targeted mach0

(X.X.X.1) and mach2 (X.X.X.3) on H_1 have targeted mach1 (X.X.X.7) only on H_2. Inversely, all these IPs which have targeted mach0 (X.X.X.6) and mach2 (X.X.X.8) on H_2 have only targeted mach1 (X.X.X.3) only on H_1. This can be seen as a limitation of our local honeypot platforms.
Indeed, we will not be able to distinguish attacks with larger scan hops. We are not aware of any tool using this strategy. However, a complementary confirmation can be checked by means of large telescopes and blacknets.

– For 3% of Type II attacks: They concern attacks on the sole two Windows machines mach0 and mach1, and on both environments H_1 and H_2. They are for instance attack attempts on port 5554 (Sasser Worm FTP Server [Res04]) or port 9898 (Dabber Worm backdoor [LUR04]). It is clearly not the usual propagation techniques referring to these worms. We face attacks that know a priori the Windows machines on both environments, and that have made some random-like attempts on them. Indeed, we do not observe attempts on both ports but only one on each machine. The attacking IPs are also not observed on both environments, unlike the others.

This leads to a second assertion:

Assertion 2 *Attacks targeting two out of three machines can be specific to the two victim machines, but are with high probability residues of scanning activities.*

Type I Attack Analysis Categories of type I are far more difficult to compare between environments H_1 and H_2. They stem for around 60% of all attacks on both. Figures 3 represent some global characteristics of such attacks on both environments. To be more precise, Figure 3(a) presents the geographical location of the attack sources corresponding to Type I attacks. On the horizontal axis are presented the top 10 countries. The vertical axis gives the number of associated attacking sources for each environment. Figure 3(b) gives the estimated attacking OS, based on passive OS fingerprinting techniques [pof04]. The vertical axis gives also the number of associated attacking sources for each environment.

As a general remark, there is no important differences between environments H_1 and H_2. For instance, both are targeted by 4 main countries with same order of importance (France FR, China CN, Germany DE, United States of America US)[4]. The other country participations are more variable over months but remain coherent between both environments. The passive fingerprinting analysis confirms this similarity between attacks on the two environments too. The IP sources which attack the platforms are essentially running on Windows. To complete this comparison, Figure 3.2 lists the 10 most targeted ports on each platform H_1 and H_2. The vertical axis shows the number of associated attacking sources for each environment. The order is identical and the number of attacks on those 10 ports are very similar on both environments.

In summary, Type I attacks represent lots of common characteristics between platforms H_1 and H_2. On the other hand, the amount of information collected on both environments is totally different. Through the high interaction platform H_1, 480684 packets have been sent against virtual machines. This is 40 times more

[4] The geographical location has been obtained by means of the Maxmind commercial utility [max04]



(a) Attacking Countries



(b) Passive Fingerprinting

Fig. 3. Global statistics Comparison between H_1 and H_2



Fig. 4. Top 10 Targeted Ports for Type I attacks on each platform H1 and H2

than through H_2 environment. It is quite normal, insofar as many attacks target *talkative* services like Microsoft ones. The following Section intends to present a refined analysis of the differences which are mainly due Type I attacks.

3.3 Refined Analysis on Type I attack

Different Type I categories As we have shown in the previous Section, Type I attacks present very similar global statistics (see Figures 3 and 3.2). On the other hand, the number of collected packets is totally different. Based on the comparison we make between the two platforms, we thus propose to refine the Type I attack analysis. From the observations that have been made previously, it appears that attacks of Type I can correspond to at least two phenomena. They are listed in the following. The third category gathers all the other *non classified* attacks:

– Sequential Scans residue: This is the first category of Type I attacks. They are to be compared with the same large scanning activities than we presented in Section 3.2. This case can be rare but we can also imagine that two losses can happen on the same environment. It is simply identified by looking at common IP addresses on both environments which have targeted one machine

on one environment and three virtual machines on the other one, during a short period of time. We find the same number of corresponding sources on H_1 and on H_2, 1 out of 1000 Type III attacks in average.
To validate that it correctly corresponds to packet losses, we consider that if for a period $\Delta(t)$ the estimated packet loss between the attacking source and the honeypots environment is p_loss, then the probability Pr to observe two losses out of three scans becomes approximatively: $Pr = 3 * p\_loss^2 * (1 - p\_loss)$. This remains coherent with the low number of cases we observe. This category has been observed thanks to the complementarities between H_1 and H_2. Indeed, a single environment cannot allow identifying such attacks.

– Random Propagation Activities: This is the second category of Type I attacks we can imagine. Many tools choose random IPs during their propagation process. This can be worms or bots (Sasser, W32/Agobot, Bobax, etc... [Res04, SOP04]). As they choose their victims randomly, it is very likely we observe the same Source only once. Indeed, we notice that IP Addresses in general are not observed twice on both environments H_1 and on H_2. To identify these Type I attacks, we have decided to build a technique upon the work already published: we have presented in [PD04a] a clustering algorithm that allows identifying root causes of frequent processes observed in one environment. Due to space limitations, we report the interested reader to [PD04a] for a detailed description of the clustering technique. To make it short, we basically gather all attacks presenting some common features (duration of the attacks, number of packets sent, targeted ports...) based on generalization techniques and association-rules mining. The resulting clusters are further refined using "phrase distance" between attack payloads. In summary, we gather on one cluster attack sources having performed same attack processes and which have many common characteristics.
As a consequence, tools propagating through random IPs have similar characteristics, even if they are not observed twice on the environments, so they should belong to the very same cluster. These Type I sources are more precisely characterized by clusters where all Sources have targeted only one virtual machine, and where the attacks within a same cluster are equally distributed among virtual machines. If the distribution of the attacks per virtual machine is equiprobable (which means we do not observe a significant number of attacks on a limited number of honeypots), we consider the associated attack belongs to this category. We perform it in an automatic way following the algorithm presented in Figure 3.3 for each cluster. It simply consists in finding all clusters that have the property explained above. A result of 1 means that the attack associated to Cluster C_j belongs to the *Random Propagation Attack category*. Null Results are discussed in the following category.
If we consider the 240 clusters associated to attacks on H_1, only 54 correspond to type I attacks. In addition, 43 out of these 54 clusters have *random propagation strategies* (according to algorithm 3.3).The remaining 0.5% of the observed clusters that are associated to type I attacks are discussed in the next category. Finally, we want to point out that attacks on that category can be identified from either platform H_1 or H_2.

– Targeted Attacks: This is the third category of Type I attacks. It gathers all Type I attacks which cannot be classified in the two previous categories.

They are not numerous, as explained above. They are represented by 0.5% of the clusters and imply a few dozens of attacking Sources. This category regroups various attacks of interest, due to their originality. These attacks have targeted always the same virtual machine only one environment. The reason why some attacks focus on one machine only are really worth analyzing to determine if a specific service is targeted or if it is due to other phenomena. In the following, we give two illustrative examples:

- *Example 1: Attacks on port 25666 targeting virtual machine mach0 on H_1.* This attack has been observed 387 times from 378 different IP addresses between August 2004 and February 2005. Each attack source sends in average three packets to mach0. A closer look reveals that all packets have 80 or 8080 (http) as TCP source port and RST-ACK flags set. They are replies to DoS attacks against web servers, also known as *backscatters* ([MVS01]). In summary, we have observed for 6 months DoS attacks against different web servers, and these attacks always spoofed mach0 IP address with source port 25666. Such regular processes have been observed in both German and French environments. Up to now, we observed 15 of these processes.

  First, the attacks are very steady over time. We observe at least traces every day in the given example. Second, it seems surprising DoS tools spoof static addresses: either spoofed (IP,port) are somehow hardcoded in the tool (which would be more than bizarre), or this six-month DoS attacks are part of a unique process launched against them over months. By a unique process, we suggest that the spoofed address list has been generated once, and it has then been used for multiple attacks. The regularity of such a process also indicates a common cause that has decided to target quite a stable amount of servers each day. Finally, these *periodic backscatters* come to ports that are likely close on both environments (hugely very high non-privileged ports in the range $[1025, 65535]$). Thus, we would get the same amount of information, whatever the targeted environment is.
- *Example 2: Targeted port 5000 Attack on mach1 on H_2.* Two very different worms are currently responsible for port 5000 scans. The first, *Bobax*, uses port 5000 to identify Windows XP systems. Windows XP uses port 5000 (TCP) for 'Universal Plug and Play (UPnP)', which is by default open. The second worm, *Kibuv*, uses an old vulnerability in Windows XP's UPnP implementation to exploit systems. This vulnerability was one of the first discovered in Windows XP and patches have been available. However, we observe a cluster that is associated to that port. It gathers 73 distinct IP sources that have targeted only one honeypot machine on port sequence 5000. Surprisingly enough, the 73 attacks occurred on the very same virtual machine within two months. This does not match the Bobax and Kibuv worm propagation scheme, as it has been found they scan machines randomly. In addition, it is important to note that the port is closed on that machine. Packets contain no payload. They are limited to half a dozen TCP SYN packets. This attack cannot be considered as random insofar as it always implies the same virtual target.

At this time writing, we have no concrete explanation of such a phenomenon. It has also been noticed by other administrators in Incidents mailing lists [san04]. The Michigan Internet Motion Sensors group notifies in [ins04] that the observed activities do "not support the theory of Kibuv entirely". This might be due to revived threats such as *Sockets de Troie (Blazer 5)* or *1998 Trojan ICKiller* or Yahoo Chat or non-referenced tools based on the UPnP exploit [ick05, upn03]. A closer look at the received packets is required at this stage to determine the attack. However, as the port 5000 is close in both platforms H_1 and H_2, we would get the same amount of information, whatever the targeted environment is.

For each Cluster C_j of type I:

Preliminaries :

Compute the number N_j of attacks associated to C_j on the Environment
Compute the number $N_{j,0}$ of attacks associated to C_j on the virtual machine mach0
Compute the number $N_{j,1}$ of attacks associated to C_j on the virtual machine mach1
Compute the number $N_{j,2}$ of attacks associated to C_j on the virtual machine mach2
We check that $N_{j,0} + N_{j,1} + N_{j,2} = N_j$
$Threshold = 0.1N_j$

Test on Cluster C_j:

Mean $= \mu = \frac{N_j}{3}$

variance $= \sigma^2 = \frac{\sum_{0 \leq k \leq 2}(N_{j,k} - \mu)^2}{3}$

IF $\sigma < Threshold$
THEN
$res = 1$
Cluster C_j associated to random propagation tools
ELSE
$res = 0$
Cluster C_j associated to targeted attacks
A closer look at packet contents is required.

Table 3. Verification process of a request with the improved protocol

Type I attacks are very interesting. After distinguishing backscatters and tools with widespread random propagation, a few numbers of attacks remain unclassified. They seem to be specific to the platform itself, so some precautions must be required to understand them. At this time writing, they are hidden in the noisy permanent activities and thus, they do not really trigger lots of attention. Simple honeypots emulating a few IPs allow identifying them. This is a preliminary but necessary step to start their in-depth analysis. Then, more interaction on that port would bring valuable information on that attack. As the attack is very specific and we have no preliminary knowledge on it, writing a simple script to H_2 is not the correct choice. A controlled environment like H_1 must be built to observe the attack details against real interactive systems. In a second step, a script can be developed for H_2.

We show here that high interaction honeypots are very complementary to low interaction honeypots as they can indicate which services are not currently

interactive enough on low interaction honeypots. We intend in the last Section to make this analysis more automatic so that we can determine which services must be developed (by means of scripts) on the low interaction honeypot to get a similar amount of information.

Interaction Differences and Improvements The platforms are globally targeted the same way, as it has been detailed in the last Sections. However, it is also clear that we collect more data on a high interaction honeypot, as real services are communicating. In average, 50 more times packets are collected with H_1 than with H_2. Based on these observations, this Section intends to show where the information is lacking, and how this can be handled.

As specified in Section 2, platforms H_1 and H_2 have similar configurations. All open ports on machines in H_1 are also opened in H_2, and vice-versa. On H_2 side, it can be sufficient to open a port in order to get attack information. It can also be necessary to develop simple emulation scripts in order to enhance the environment interaction. Thus, the idea is the following: The more attacks interact with a port, the more important it is that Honeyd runs an interactive script behind. In other words, if the amount of information we obtain on attacks through a given port on H_1 is a lot higher than the one captured on H_2 against the same port, one of the two following actions must be undertaken:

- A script must be implemented to emulate the associated service if any.
- The script interaction should be brought to a higher level if the script already exists.

Obviously enough, each attack may require different interaction levels. For instance, scans do not require high interaction and an open port on both environments will give the same amount of information.

Furthermore, the error would be here to consider only packets from/to a given port to compare the amount of information between the two environments. For instance, if a Source sends a request on port A and then waits for the answer to communicate with port B, the lacking information if port A is closed on the other environment is a lot more important than just considering the simple request/answer on port A. We miss all the communication with port B either.

As a consequence, we use the clusters presented in [PD04a] and introduced in Section 3.3 to avoid these problems and to determine what services are not correctly interactive on H_2. Each cluster groups together all IP Sources sharing strong characteristics on their attack processes. These attacking sources have exchanged quite the same amount of information on one environment. The interaction we get on a virtual machine must be weighted by the frequency of the attacks on the involved ports, as we explain above. The interaction is quantified by considering the number of exchanged packets. This can be refined by taking payload length into account, but we limit this analysis on this simple assumption. This leads to the following algorithm in Figure 4:

The algorithm has been launched on each platform for a 2-month period. We get the following results:

- For ports where simple scripts are already attached to in H_2, it appears they behave correctly compared to the real services running in H_1.

Preliminaries :

For Successive Environments H_1 and H_2:
For each Virtual Machine M_j and each associated port $p_{j,k}$:

Gather the list of Clusters $C_{l,k}$ corresponding to attacks on Virtual Machine M_j against at least port $p_{j,k}$
Be N the total number of IP Sources having targeted Virtual machine M_j
Be η the threshold to compare interactions between environments. $\eta = 0.7$
FOR EACH Cluster $C_{l,k}$
Compute the number n_l of Sources belonging to Cluster $C_{l,k}$
Compute P_l, the total number of exchanged packets between Sources belonging to Cluster $C_{l,k}$
Compute the *frequency* of Cluster $C_{l,k}$ as

$$f_l = \frac{n_l}{N}$$

Interaction Estimation:

The interaction estimation is for H_1

$$I(H_1) = \sum_{l \geq 1} P_l.f_l$$

The interaction estimation is for H_2

$$I(H_2) = \sum_{m \geq 1} P_m.f_m$$

Analysis:

IF $\frac{I(H_2)}{I(H_1)} \leq \eta$
The current implementation on port $p_{j,k}$ for Virtual Machine M_j in H_2 is not correct
The Interaction on this port is not satisfactory. The associated script should be enhanced.

Table 4. Comparing Interactions between H_1 and H_2

- For ports Microsoft and Netbios (135, 139 and 445 specially), the ratio $\frac{I(H_2)}{I(H_1)}$ is equal to 1.5%. No script emulates these services in H_2. This is clearly not acceptable, insofar as H_2 is missing a large quantity of information in comparison to H_1. We are in the process of writing scripts to emulate these services.
- For other ports like 111, 515,. . . , the operation of opening these ports provides as much information as the real services in H_1 at this time. There is no need to emulate these services.

The algorithm gives an important hint of which ports are not correctly configured on the low interaction environment. It also provides a priority list of those emulating ports that should be urgently modified. The result confirms that most of the missing information comes from the Microsoft services. To conclude, this algorithm highlights the important complementarities that can be obtained by using both a high interaction and a low interaction honeypot.

4 Leurre.com Project

4.1 Motivations

We have presented in previous publications some experiments based on a high interaction honeypot [PD04a, PD04b]. These experiments have shown that most of the attacks are caused by a few number of attack tools and that there are very stable processes occurring in the wild. As one major objective is to get statistical information from the attacks, it appears that lower interaction honeypots can

be sufficient enough. Indeed, we do not want our platforms to be corrupted as main honeypot applications intend to [Spi02b]. We only want to observe the first attack steps in order to get a better understanding of current malicious activities. This paper provides another strong motivation, as it shows that low interaction honeypots brings equivalent global statistics on the attacks. In addition, some regular comparisons like we do between both types of environments lead to an optimization of the low interaction configuration.

As a direct consequence, we have decided to deploy low interaction honeypots in various places. Leurre.com project aims at disseminating such platforms everywhere thanks to motivated partners as part of the Leurre.com project. Partners are invited to join this project and install one platform on their own. Eurecom takes care of the installation by furnishing the platform image and configuration files. Thus, the install process is automatic. In exchange, we give the partners an access to the database and its enriched information [5]. We are also developing a dedicated web to make research faster and more efficient. The project starts triggering interest from many organizations, whatever academic, industrial of governmental. We hope the number of partners will keep on increasing in a near future.

5 Conclusion

This paper presents a very important contribution to the Leurre.com Project. Indeed, it shows on one hand that high interaction honeypots are somehow superfluous in the large-scale deployment of statistical sensors, since global statistics remain very similar. On the other hand, it shows that they are vital to control the configuration relevance of low interaction honeypots. This leads to the conclusion that complementarities between high and low interaction honeypots can increase the accuracy of information collected by simple environments deployed in different places.

Besides, this comparison has led to an interesting analysis of collected data. First, it allows identifying very specific attacks and weird phenomena, as this has been shown through some examples. The latter require particular attention to be analysed and understood. Second, it highlights the need to take into account packet losses in the analysis of malicious data. Otherwise, this can lead to many misunderstandings. Most of the previous points must be carefully analyzed and are part of our future work.

Finally, we hope this paper will be an incitement for other partners to join the open project Leurre.com that we are deploying.

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